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"No One Needs to Worry": Chavez versus American Primacy

Hugo Chávez is an easy figure to dismiss. His rhetoric often turns many people off and makes him appear to be less intelligent and less capable than he is. But his actions speak louder than his words, and his recent actions in the region present a threat to the United States both in security and in status.

The main threat is not direct, but rather indirect. Chávez is spreading his influence, like roots of a tree, in every direction in South America, and often in barely visible ways. While ostensibly these efforts are to promote a greater regional unity, in effect they limit the influence of the United States, supplanting Washington with Caracas. According to Bradley Thayer, a frequent commentator on American primacy, as allies begin to shift their dependencies away from the United States towards Venezuela or elsewhere, the age of American Primacy is coming to an end.

The Emergence of Hugo Chávez

Chávez seems to be a typical populist, but his fervor goes beyond the traditional South American indigenous sentiments of anti-foreign imperialism and fears of restricted access to fair shares of power and wealth.
For the 40 years prior to Chávez, Venezuela was ruled through an exclusive power sharing alliance between the AD and COPEI. There was no political competition outside of these two parties and as a result, politicians in the AD/COPEI alliance became quite corrupt and disconnected from their constituency.

Enter Hugo Chávez. With the GDP falling some 40% between 1980 and 1990, Chávez staged a military coup in 1992. Though it ultimately failed, he used his two-year jail stint to develop the crude beginnings of a political party. This groundwork led to his successful election in 1998, where he won 56% of the vote. A year later, he commissioned a constituent assembly that radically rewrote the constitution, lending the legitimate basis for Chávez’s extensive powers today. As with many countries facing economic turmoil, Venezuelans seemed willing to temporarily suspend some measures of democracy in exchange for a more equitable redistribution of wealth and rights.

The Early U.S. – Chávez Relationship
The tension between the U.S. and Chávez began before he was elected. As a presidential candidate in 1998, Chávez was invited to Miami for an interview. The United States denied his visa request as he was considered a terror risk due to his 1992 coup. The denial was expected, but the U.S. embassy went a step further by releasing a statement on the reasons for the denial publicly. Chávez tried to make light of it in an interview by pulling a credit card out of his wallet and saying “What do you mean? I have a Visa.” [1]

After inauguration, Chávez planned to go on a trip to Spain, Cuba, the U.S. and the Dominican Republic. Officials from the U.S. Department of State informed Chávez that he should not visit Cuba before coming to the United States. Chávez chafed at the request and ultimately ignored it. As a result, he was greeted in an unofficial capacity by President Clinton who was allegedly clad in a t-shirt and jeans carrying a soda. [2]
Chávez did little to endear himself to Washington after September 11, 2001. He gave a speech supporting the hypothesis that the U.S. dynamited the towers on purpose. Washington’s response was swift and the comments remain an open sore in U.S. – Venezuelan relations.

The Coup of 2002
The key breaking point of the Chávez-U.S. relationship was the coup attempt in 2002. In April, officials at the Venezuelan oil company (Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (or PDVSA) went on strike. When ordered to stop the strike, the military demurred, asking Chávez to step down. A group of military officers ousted Chávez from power, installing business leader Pedro Carmona. Carmona immediately disbanded almost every constitutional institution, including the Supreme Court and the National Assembly, which ultimately led to his quick demise as President. On April 14, just two days after Carmona took power, Chávez was ushered back to restore order. [3]

The United States role in the coup remains unclear. Both official and unofficial accounts acknowledge that the U.S. Embassy in Caracas was meeting with the opposition groups involved in the coup regularly leading up to the coup. It is also public knowledge that these opposition groups received a large amount of funding from the United States through institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy and the International Republican Institute. However, what the meetings and aid amounted to, whether just standard protocol or inciting the coup, is unclear and arguably irrelevant. Here perception is reality. Chávez and his supporters have always believed that the United States has played a direct role in the events of April 2002 and frankly, the United States has done little to convince him otherwise.

Some things Chávez does may never be attributable to anything more substantive than Chávez being Chávez. However, by understanding the roots of his power and his hatred of the United States, most of the policies he adopts and speeches he makes, though definitely bombastic, can be judged rational.

Direct Threats

Chávez threatens U.S. primacy mainly through indirect means such as economic agreements with U.S. allies and enemies that seek to counter or replace U.S. influence in the region. However, Venezuela can threaten U.S. security directly. Venezuela has recently begun expanding its military exponentially. While, in the long term, it does not appear possible for Venezuela to successfully challenge the U.S. in a direct military confrontation, these developments certainly complicate (if not destabilize) the South American security environment, could potentially limit U.S. freedom of action in the region, and therefore should not be overlooked.

Conventional Growth and Russian Arms Deals
Though minimal, Venezuela does pose a growing conventional military threat to the United States. Venezuela’s arms spending is now the highest in the region, totaling over $4 billion annually. The primary objective of the recent arms buildup, according to Venezuelan officials, is to deter a potential U.S. attack. Spending increased 12.5% in 2006 and Russia was the primary supplier. Venezuela purchased $3 billion worth of military equipment from Russia in 2006, including 24 fighter aircraft, 50 helicopters and 100,000 automatic rifles. Later, Russia began construction on two factories in Venezuela to mass-produce the AK-47 rifle. In June of this year, Russia agreed to sell Venezuela five submarines.

“No one needs to worry,” Chávez told the world, but the United States is certainly not heeding that advice. Several high-ranking U.S. officials have called for Russia, who is also selling missile systems to Iran, to stop selling arms to Venezuela. Russian President Vladimir Putin replied through the state news agency that the deal was “a question of state prestige” and “an absolute priority.”

Though Chávez could use these weapons to directly threaten or deter the United States, these weapons will have a greater effect on Venezuela’s immediate vicinity. Colombia has previously accused Chávez of supporting leftist rebel groups along their shared border. Prominent Brazilian politician Jose Sarney said it best in a New York Times article: “Venezuela is buying arms… which unbalance forces within the continent. We cannot let Venezuela become a military power” Attempts by Brazil or others to counter Venezuela’s growing might will lead to an arms race, further destabilizing the region both from a security but more importantly from an economic standpoint.

Counternarcotic Cooperation
Chávez has also threatened U.S. security by thwarting U.S. counternarcotic efforts in the region. Venezuela stopped allowing U.S. surveillance flights in 1999, which Caracas said violated Venezuelan sovereignty, comparing DEA agents to an occupation force, according to the Voice of America. All bilateral cooperation between the DEA and Venezuela was cut in 2005. Most recently, Venezuela was decertified by the Department of State, which cut all U.S anti-drug funding to Venezuela and obligated the United States to vote against funding for Venezuela in international institutions.

Venezuela remains a very important piece to U.S. counternarcotic efforts in Latin America despite complications in the bilateral relationship and progress is still being made. The United States pours approximately $700 million per year into the Andean region, topping $25 billion in the past two decades, the majority of which is spent on anti-drug efforts, largely in Colombia. Of this money, Venezuela has received only $3 million for fiscal year 2005, a 40% decrease from FY 2004.

The Congressional Research Service reported in 2005 that cocaine seizures in Venezuela increased by 113% between 2002 and 2003 while funding decreased 59% during the same period. American radar tracking reported that suspected northbound drug flights from Venezuela tripled between 2003 and 2006. Experts estimate that a full third of the cocaine Colombia produces annually, some 220 tons, now passes through Venezuela on its way to the United States and Europe.

Key Next Steps
The next step is unclear. Venezuela’s military growth must be contained, so long as its official rhetoric sounds revolutionary. Yet it is difficult for the United States to tell Russia and other nations not to trade with Venezuela while still accepting 11% of its oil from the same nation. However, the United States needs to assuage concerns, particularly from Colombia, that stability in the region is a key concern of Washington, especially through the maelstrom of other current commitments.

Venezuela’s role as a key point in the northward narcotics trade is growing exponentially. However, getting Venezuela to actively aid the American anti-drug effort is much more difficult. It is clear that for the short-term future, the Venezuelan government will not allow U.S. operatives to return to Venezuela. Offering direct aid will have unintended consequences, such as supporting corrupt military units or insurgent groups across the border in Colombia. Increasing Venezuela’s military might at this time creates uncertainty in the region about Chávez’s intentions as well as those of the United States who would appear to be supporting the regime’s ambitions.

Ultimately, the United States needs to weigh whether to contain Chávez or conduct counternarcotic operations in South America. If the latter, Washington will need to offer Caracas a sizable amount of concessions and latitude, while working hard to offset the losses in the U.S. image abroad and at home for supporting Chávez to this end. If the former prevails, the U.S. should consider shifting their anti-drug strategy to a demand side operation to avoid the complicated political situation Chávez poses in Latin America (or even Central Asia).

Overall, the direct threats posed by Venezuela, both in conventional capabilities and denial of key operations to secure the United States should not be the sole focus of the U.S. However, they are significant enough that they should not be ignored and should be an important if subordinate part of future policies in the region.

Indirect Threats

While Venezuela can threaten the United States directly, its ability to threaten the United States indirectly is the most troublesome. Hugo Chávez has been employing a combination of tactics ranging from bilateral barter arrangements to creating international institutions parallel to those created by the U.S., all in an effort to supplant U.S. dominant influence in the region with his own. Further, he has been expanding agreements with countries such as China, Iran and Russia to encourage expansion of their investments and thus strategic interests in the region.

Chávez’s efforts to spread his influence throughout the region, and his budding relationships with some of Washington’s largest competitor and adversarial states comprise a concerted effort to limit U.S influence in a region it has dominated since Monroe. If ultimately successful, the marginalization of the United States in South America certainly signals the decline of U.S. primacy.

Chávez in the Region
Since coming to power, Chávez has been working hard to increase his influence in the region, gains in which come largely at the expense of American influence. From using barter systems instead of dollar-based trade, to complicating U.S. antinarcotics efforts in the region, Chávez is steadily countering U.S. activities in the region in both economic and security realms. This generally compromises U.S. interests and limits U.S. leverage in South America. Further, a shift of traditional allies and clients away from the U.S. towards another regional power, especially in a region so close to home, appears to herald the decline of U.S. primacy.

Instead of using the United States dollar (USD) in exchanges of aid to countries in the region, Chávez and Venezuela have begun to implement barter-style exchanges. In 2004, Venezuela delivered $300 million of fuel oil to Argentina to cover a fuel shortage. Argentina paid for this not with USD but with cattle, agricultural and medical equipment. This agreement expanded the next year with more oil being exchanged for Venezuelan tanker refurbishing in Argentine ports and farm machinery. Similar exchanges, occurring throughout the Andes, could ultimately make the USD largely unnecessary in South America. States would not require large USD reserves on hand to transact with other states in the region, further weakening the dollar and U.S. influence.

Besides bartering, Chávez has bestowed outright gifts on his neighbors. Chávez has bought $2.5 billion of Argentina’s debt, offered $1 billion in credit to Ecuador for debt service payments and $140 million to Bolivia with another $1.5 in infrastructure investments on the way. Recently, he gave a check for $3.7 million to Wilfredo Vargas, Commander in Chief of the Bolivian Armed Forces to rebuild barracks, part of a $6.3 million overall donation.

Chávez is also working with other states in the region to develop alternatives to the U.S.-designed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to the BBC, Chávez has defined these institutions as “fatally wounded” that represent the “chains of imperialism”. He has created the Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (or Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America, known by the acronym ALBA which is Spanish for “dawn”), which serves as a U.S.-free trade group comprised so far of only Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and Bolivia. He has also proposed creating the Banco del Sur (Bank of the South), which would serve as the indigenous development bank for South America, capitalizing on the obvious failures of the World Bank and the IMF in the region. Chávez has also proposed two regional energy cooperatives, PetroSur and PetroCaribe, that provide discount oil to Venezuela’s neighbors.

These institutions, coupled with Telesur, the Bolivarian response to CNN, and the new Villa de Cine (Cinema City), meant to be the Bolivarian alternative to Hollywood, signal an attempt by Chávez to expand his influence culturally as well as economically by stoking anti-Western sentiment. This expansion comes clearly at the expense of U.S. influence in the region both culturally and economically.

Case Study: Colombian-Venezuelan Relations
Perhaps the largest concern, and best case study, is the growing relationship between Chávez and Álvaro Uribe Vélez of Colombia. Still considered to be the strongest ally of the U.S. in the region, Colombia has begun to shift its loyalties from the United States to Venezuela recently, signaling a decline in U.S. primacy in the region.

Relations between the United States and Colombia are ebbing. Counternarcotic funding has declined recently and the free trade agreement between Colombia and the United States expired in July. Congress has yet to ratify its replacement. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, was quoted by the Financial Times stating “if [the free trade agreement] doesn’t pass, someone like Chavez, if not Chávez himself, is undoubtedly make the argument that the United States doesn’t take care of its friends… and we wish not to give that argument to our adversaries in the region.

Previous relations between the two were strained over an age-old border dispute, Colombian allegations that Chávez was aiding insurgent groups in Colombia and Venezuelan allegations that Colombia was a U.S. puppet state. But recently, Uribe and Chávez have worked quickly to tighten energy ties, build pipelines, increase trade and resolve territorial disputes. Bilateral trade between the two countries reached $4 billion this year, a record in their relationship. An existing pipeline will increase exports of natural gas from Colombia to Venezuela. A proposed pipeline in Colombia, first reported in the New York Times, will reduce the delivery time of Venezuelan crude oil to China.

Manuel Rocha, a former State Department official, noted to the Financial Times that Uribe will no longer be able to count on unconditional U.S. support and this will push Uribe closer to Chavez. “Uribe realizes that it is time to diversify strategic relations,” said Vicente Torrijos, a political analyst in Bogotá in the Miami Herald. “Before [Uribe] leaves office,” said Rocha, “he will be closer to Caracas than Washington.”
The question posed by the Colombian magazine Poder remains, “How long with the honeymoon last?” Chavez’s relations with Uribe and Colombia are not growing without setbacks and are not immune from critical gaffes that reflect the same diplomatic tact that prompted the King of Spain publicly instruct Chávez to “shut up”.

In the past, Chávez has been unable or unwilling to secure his border with Colombia, and the Colombian government has accused him of harboring leaders of the Marxist rebel group FARC in Venezuela. Colombia has entered Venezuelan territory on several occasions to chase down fleeing guerillas, which resulted in strong rebukes from Chavez. Bogotá has accused Chávez of supporting the FARC.

However, recently the conflict between Colombia and the FARC evolved and presented Chávez with a unique opportunity to increase his influence in the Andes. The FARC holds 3,000 hostages including three American State Department contractors, and former Colombian presidential candidate and French national Ingrid Betancourt. Recently, pressure on Uribe to resolve the situation has increased both domestically and from Washington and Paris. After failing to reach an agreement with the FARC on preconditions for negotiations, Uribe was at an impasse. Enter Hugo Chávez, who after being previously denied the opportunity to negotiate with the FARC was finally given an opportunity last fall.

Hopes he could resolve the situation were fleeting. Talks broke down on November 19, 2007 with an announcement from Bogotá that Chávez’s services were no longer welcome. Chávez had been very public about the details of negotiations, often tipping Uribe’s hand. However, according to Bogotá, the turning point was when he directly contacted Colombian General Mario Montoya. “General Montoya, it’s Hugo,” Montoya said recounting the conversation in the Washington Post, “How are you?” The general reported to Colombian authorities that Chávez was inquiring about the number of hostages the FARC is holding and other specifics. From Bogotá, a revolutionary leader such as Chávez speaking directly to an Army general signals a coup, and is a very serious offense. The damage of this conversation was mitigated by a timely report from a loyal officer, but it cannot be assumed that this was the only conversation.

Chávez denies the conversation took place at all. “They issued a statement yesterday filled with lies, and that is very, very serious,” said Chávez in his official response. “They have spat brutally in our face when we worked heart and soul to try to get them on the road to peace…. Everyone should be on alert with respect to Colombia. The companies that the Colombians have here, the companies that we have over there… all of that is damaged,” he continued, concluding that it was “lamentable.”

It is unlikely that this row will fundamentally disrupt Colombian-Venezuelan relations in the long term, as the mutual economic dependencies described above will prevail. However, this incident (or alleged incident) does have key implications. It was a failure for Chávez in what he hoped would be a key step in his emergence as a regional leader. Whether this development is fabricated – indicating that Uribe did not want to achieve peace as Chávez alleges – or whether it is real – possibly implicating that the FARC and Chávez are conspiring to overthrow the Colombian government, it can be safely assumed that negotiations with the FARC are on hold. This leaves only one other option for Uribe to retain potency as Colombian president: actively combat the FARC. To do so, he will need the help of the United States. The U.S. Congress, who has heretofore overlooked the War on Drugs for the War on Terror, needs to seize this opportunity to bolster the United States largest ally in the region while working to marginalize its loudest enemy.

Chávez in the World: China and Oil
While Venezuela holds one of the world’s largest oil reserves, it can only recover 18% of it with current technology, according to the Wall Street Journal. Instead of investing in new technologies, Chávez is using oil revenue for social programs. Instead of using foreign investors to develop technologies, he instituted strict regulations to kick them out. PDVSA has struggled to keep up production previously and is now in control of a much larger portfolio since Exxon Mobile and ConocoPhillips withdrew from Venezuela this year, Reuters reported.

Chávez appeared to realize the errors of his ways by inviting China’s investment in the region, but simultaneously has exposed a large vulnerability in his hold on power. Dependency upon a single commodity has historically spelled huge trouble for Latin and South American economies and Chávez could not withstand even a moderate drop in oil production.

In late December 2004 and early January 2005, Chávez and Vice President Zeng Quinghong of China exchanged visits, culminating in a series of energy deals signed on January 29, 2005. These agreements gave China access to Venezuela’s oil market in exchange for Chinese investment of over $400 million to develop Venezuela’s oil and natural gas reserves.

Chinese investment is preliminary, but shows that China is interested in expanding into Latin American markets. Formerly forbidden by the Monroe Doctrine, China’s deals with Venezuela represent part of a broader plan, which includes exploring similar arrangements with Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Argentina. Roger Tissot, a analyst of political and economic risk in oil markets, asserts in the New York Times that the “Chinese are entering [the Latin American economies] without political expectations or demands.”

Traditional energy sources in the Middle East are becoming increasingly unstable and calls are growing for the United States to find another source of energy besides the Persian Gulf. An obvious alternative would be Latin America. The United States already imports 11% of its oil from Venezuela, but could expand further into Venezuela or other states for its oil and natural gas needs in the future. However, Chinese incursion into Latin American markets likely will not leave enough pie for the United States, leading to either continued U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern sources or a confrontation with China, directly or indirectly, over the distribution of Latin American energy exports.

Certainly in the short term, the “United States should not be concerned,” said Venezuelan energy minister Rafael Ramírez in the Washington Post after concluding the deal which he says “in no way means that [Venezuela] will be withdrawing from the North American market for political reasons.” Venezuela’s oil requires a unique refining process and CITGO, PDVSA’s U.S. subsidiary, has invested heavily in nine refineries in the U.S. for this purpose. Venezuela could not, if they wanted to, feasibly retract completely from the U.S. market, as the infrastructure does not yet exist for a smooth transition to an alternative market such as China at the full capacity the U.S. imports. A GAO study, conducted after the Venezuelan oil strike of 2002-2003 concluded that oil revenues comprise 40-50% of government revenues in Venezuela and a severe drop, such as would result after retracting from the U.S. market in the short term, would “cripple the economy” and represent a “grave threat to the government and country as a whole.”

However, this deal signals that China is willing to make long term investments to develop the Venezuelan market into something they can use, likely at the expense of the United States. This eventuality would leave the U.S. with scant few alternatives to Middle East oil dependency. The GAO highlights that long-term reductions in Venezuelan oil exports to the United States are “a concern for U.S. energy security.” A six-month loss of Venezuelan oil production, given ceteris paribus, would result in an $11 dollar per barrel jump and a $23 billion dollar loss in the U.S gross domestic product.

While almost any energy deal between an outside country and Latin America would result in similar concerns, the Chinese-Venezuelan relationship presents unique problems as well. Chávez recognizes that China is emerging as a competitor to the United States and inviting Chinese investment will certainly not lend comfort to Washington. More importantly, China is a buyer that will not let moral scruples – such as the lack of democracy and civil rights – stop its investment. This limits the United States ability to enforce its will – specifically calls for a restoration of democracy and civil rights – through economic tools, such as sanctions.

Some argue that China’s investment is innocuous until, as a 2005 CRS report pointed out, “China begins to take action to protect its interests in the region.” China now has a direct interest in the continuity of its trade, and the continuity of the Chávez regime by extension. This severely limits U.S. freedom of action on the continent and represents the largest incursion of a foreign power into the Western Hemisphere since the Monroe Doctrine.

Beyond the oil deal, China has been steadily increasing its military cooperation with Venezuela as well. In 1985, the People’s Liberation Army opened its National Defense University (PLA NDU) and developed a course for foreign officers from Latin America and elsewhere, similar to the U.S. Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (formerly the School of Americas (SOA)). As relations between the U.S. and Venezuela waned, military cooperation (specifically the SOA) followed, and Venezuelan soldiers began to attend PLA NDU. Increased bilateral military cooperation between Venezuela and China, and other Latin American nations and China, serves to supplant U.S. influence in the region.

Chávez and Venezuela are looking beyond just China in its effort to expand its influence at the expense of the United States. As discussed above, Russia began selling Venezuela arms in 2006 and Iran’s Prime Minister Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has met several times with his Venezuelan counterpart since 2005 as Iran has begun expanding its focus on the region. Venezuelan relations with both countries represent a minor threat to the United States currently in the short term, but as the relationships develop the threats they present will increase as well.

That said, Chávez appears limited by his own lack of diplomatic tact and self-control. Michael Shifter noted that in Latin American politics “language is very, very important. There’s a belligerence to his discourse which has been very damaging.” Despite growing anti-American sentiment, Chávez’s outbursts, such as his 2006 United Nations General Assembly address where he referred to United States President George W. Bush as “the devil”, have thus far failed to win him widespread support. Hurling insults at the Brazilian legislature, such as labeling them “parrots” of the United States, has only resulted in their delay to ratify Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur. If Chávez cannot seem to get out of his own way, there seems to be no cause for concern over his budding relationships with China and Iran, as he will ultimately bite those hands as well.

Conclusions

Despite not having conventional or unconventional capabilities to defeat the U.S. directly, Chávez remains a serious threat to the United States. By expanding his influence in the region, and now the wider world, Chávez is steadily compromising U.S. security and primacy. While Chávez faces some serious obstacles in the future, he will likely remain in power in Venezuela for the medium to long-term future. On December 2, Venezuelans voted no in a referendum on whether to pass a comprehensive revision to their constitution. However, these amendments are not yet dead and neither is Chávez. Hugo Chávez is set to remain in power until 2012 and it’s a good bet he’ll try again. While those that oppose him were able to unite and defeat the referendum, this should not be mistaken for actual solidarity. Rallying votes for a simple binary is decidedly different than ousting a president and answering the much more complicated question of who will succeed him. As of now, the opposition parties in Venezuela still remain fractured enough that the inability to agree on much more than “anything but Chávez” is precluding them from removing him.

However, where the United States can contain the spread of Venezuelan influence is with other states within the region. As the Eagle’s gaze has shifted away from the domain of the Monroe Doctrine to the Middle East, the peoples of South America have not disappeared and their problems have not diminished. In response, those formerly under the wing of the United States have looked elsewhere for their protection – they have looked to Chávez.

Basically, if the United States even partially returns its focus to the region, it would present an alternative to Chávez. Many leaders in the region have dislike Chávez and his revolutionary rhetoric, but cannot turn down his investment in their debts and his discounted energy prices. The U.S. can offer similar incentives and more without attempting to organize the indigenous peoples of recipient countries and without the subtext of revolution. Further, if the United States ultimately replaces Chávez’s influence in the region and ultimately creates prosperity in the region, perhaps even Venezuelans will realize there is a path to prosperity that doesn’t require Chávez.

NOTES:

[1] Eva Golinger. The Chávez Code: Cracking U.S. Intervention in Venezuela [Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2006], Page 26-7.

[2] Golinger, 27. Note: While this image is conceivable, I was unable to find any corroborating accounts of this event and Golinger did not cite any sources for her narrative.

[3] Kim Bartley and Donnacha O’Brien captured a remarkable representation of the coup in the documentary film The Revolution Will Not Be Televised. [Galway, Ireland: Bord Scannan na hEireann, 2003]. It can be found in online format only at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=5832390545689805144

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